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SACRED RULES, SECULAR REVELATIONS:  
THE CONCEPTIONS OF RIGHTS IN PRE-MODERN EUROPE 
 
Jason Taliadoros 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper is an attempt to reflect on the methodological approaches that I bring to ‘reading 
law’ in my current project on understandings of individual rights in the legal and theological 
texts of the twelfth- and early thirteenth-century Middle Ages, entitled ‘Sacred Rules, Secular 
Revelations: The Conceptions of Rights in Pre-Modern Europe’.1 
 
It is first necessary to say something about my own intellectual background, which informs the 
methodologies that I employ in this research. I am an historian and lawyer. Following my 
undergraduate training in law and history, I worked as a lawyer in private and in-house roles 
off and on for more than five years. In one of these ‘off’ periods, I completed my PhD in the 
discipline of history, although the subject matter of my thesis dealt with legal history, 
intellectual history, history of law, and the history of ideas. For a time I taught medieval history 
in Australia and the United States. In a subsequent, but not contiguous, ‘off’ period, I 
published this PhD thesis as a monograph (Taliadoros 2006b). My current role is the third ‘off’ 
                                                 
1 This research forms part of my Discovery Project ‘Sacred Rules, Secular Revelations: The Conceptions of Rights 
in Pre-Modern Europe’, which is funded by the Australian Government ARC through its National Competitive 
Grants Program and institutionally supported by the School of Historical Studies at Monash University. I wish to 
acknowledge and thank both these institutions. 
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period from law practice: I am employed as a post-doctoral research fellow in the discipline of 
historical studies and as a tutor and lecturer in a faculty of law. The point of this brief 
biography is to emphasise my approach as that of an historian of law and ideas and of a lawyer, 
rather than that of a ‘legal historian’, with the narrower connotations that the latter term 
implies. 
 
The project ‘Sacred Rules, Secular Revelations’ aims to explore the interaction between law and 
theology during the so-called ‘twelfth-century renaissance’, the period between approximately 
1050 and 1250 when Western Europe experienced an intellectual, cultural, and social 
transformation that scholars liken to the later Italian Renaissance (Haskins 1927).2 It will focus 
particularly on perceptions of what we today might call ‘individual human rights’, but what 
medievals called something else, in the texts of lawyers and theologians of the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries. 
 
Before examining what this ‘something else’ is, it is necessary to pause a moment to consider 
the very idea of ‘medieval human rights’. To many the phrase may appear to be an oxymoron. 
Certainly, the popular image of the Middle Ages is as the ‘Dark Ages’ and, more broadly, with 
religious and preternatural superstition and ignorance (see Freedman and Spiegel 1998). But, as 
Haskins has shown (Haskins 1927), the twelfth century in particular was an age of re-birth, re-
discovery, and reform. It, too, was an age which famously, if controversially, witnessed the ‘rise 
of the individual’ (Morris 1972; Southern 1995; cf. Bynum 1982). Therefore, a concomitant 
focus on individual or human rights should not surprise us. This new affectivity is exemplified 
in the flourishing of courtly love poetry and vernacular literature (Dronke 1986) and a more 
intense and personal religiosity (Constable 1996), all of which characterised a cultural shift 
towards the individual.  
 
At the same time, the twelfth century witnessed the establishment of paradigmatic or 
‘canonical’ texts in law and theology. In Roman law, the re-discovery of one of its most 
                                                 
2 Medievalists have now moved beyond Haskins’s use of the term ‘renaissance’ as a corrective to Burckhardt’s 
depiction of the Middle Ages as the ‘Dark Ages’, and the teleology implicit in that approach observed by 
Ankersmit (2001), as recent studies demonstrate (Colish 2003, Jaeger 2003 and Melve 2006).  
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important texts, the Digest, in northern Italy in the late eleventh-century, sparked the 
beginnings of a renewed scientific study of Roman civil law. With the presence of this book, 
containing the collective sophisticated wisdom of the Roman jurists, a true scientific 
jurisprudence could be applied to the other texts of the Roman corpus, namely the Institutes, 
the Code, and the Novels; the four works collectively comprising the complete body of 
Justinianic Roman law, known as the Corpus iuris civilis (Brundage 2008: 78). A generation of 
scholars emerged who commented on, criticized, and applied this learning; they were known as 
the glossators, after the glosses that they inserted in the texts with their insights and 
observations. These include figures such as Johannes Bassianus (d. 1197), Rogerius (fl. c. 1162), 
Placentinus (c. 1135-1192), Martinus (1100-1166/1178?), and Bulgarus (1100-1166). Many of 
these twelfth- and thirteenth-century texts are available in reliable editions, expertly prepared 
by Weigand (Weigand 1967) and Kuttner (Kuttner 1937), although a considerable amount of 
this material is available only in manuscript form.  
 
In canon law, the Concordia discordantium canonum, later known as the Decretum, for the first time 
around 1140 collected the numerous florigelia of patristic texts and maxims, church council 
determinations (both ecumenical and Western), earlier canons from Burchard of Worms and 
Ivo of Chartres, and liturgical extracts together in a single corpus. It both summarised the 
development of the law of the Christian Church in the first eleven centuries of its existence 
and provided the foundation for canonical jurisprudence until the twentieth century (Landau 
2008: 23). The Decretum, collated by the mysterious Gratian, perhaps in more than one 
recension (one some time shortly after 1139 and the other some time prior to 1158) (Winroth 
2000: 139-43), spawned a whole new generation of legal commentaries concerning its 
discordances as well as the provisional and often open-ended comments (dicta) suggested by 
Gratian. This generation of canon lawyers, who flourished from the second half of the twelfth 
century, were known as the ‘decretists’, including Paucapalea (writing before 1148), Master 
Rolandus (fl. c. 1150), Rolandus Bandinelli (later Pope Alexander III in 1152-58), and Rufinus 
(fl. c. late 1150s) (Kuttner 1937). 
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Influenced by this trend to codify and arrange, biblical scholars converted their Biblical 
exegeses and commentaries of the Bible into something more systematic for the schools: 
witness the Sententiae libri quattuor, or the Four Books of Sentences of Peter Lombard (1095x1100 – 
1160), composed around 1155-58 (Colish 1994:72). The Four Books of Sentences purported to 
gather together the relevant biblical, patristic, and ecclesiastical authorities in respect of the 
seven sacraments. Book one dealt with the Trinity; book two with Creation; book three with 
the Incarnation; and book four with the Sacraments. The Lombard’s work became the 
standard textbook for theologians for the remainder of the Middle Ages. The Four Books of 
Sentences, according to some, almost displaced the Bible as the definitive text on theology in the 
high Middle Ages. 
 
Against such an historical background, the present project explores medieval theological and 
legal discourses on individual human rights. At the outset, it is necessary to acknowledge the 
limits of a purely historical approach. As Douzinas eloquently puts it, summarizing the kind of 
history Friedrich Nietzsche and Michel Foucault attacked (Douzinas 2007: 26): 
 
History is presented as the forward march of all-conquering reason, which erases 
mistakes and combats prejudices. For historicism, the seed of a value was sown at 
some point in the past, it grew through generations and inspired people who fought for 
its realisation. After many trials and tribulations, the philosophical potentiality becomes 
finally historical actuality. 
 
The remedy against such historicism, argues Douzinas, is to apply a ‘genealogical’ method that 
focuses on ‘the contingent conditions and unforeseen circumstances out of which values grow’ 
(Douzinas 2007: 27).  
 
To avoid this charge of teleologically equating modern concepts of rights with medieval 
understandings, this project is informed by several theoretical, philosophical, and contextual 
frameworks. First, it is necessary to determine the relationship of right and duty, a concept 
which has long preoccupied thinkers over the centuries: Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) (in his 
Anarchical Fantasies in 1816) queried to what extent an individual could be considered to 
Taliadoros 
      Sortuz. Oñati Journal of  Emergent Socio-legal Studies. Vol. 3, Issue 2, 2009, pp. 78-94. 82 
possess a ‘natural’ right if it was merely to be the beneficiary of someone else’s duty, and 
reasoned that all propositions involving rights were straightforwardly translatable into 
propositions involving duties. His ruminations followed on the heels of seventeenth-century 
rights theorists such as Hugo Grotius (1583-1694), John Selden (in his De Iure Naturali et 
Gentium iuxta Disciplinam Ebraeorum 1640), Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) (in his Leviathan 1651) 
and John Locke (1632-1704), whom many regard as establishing the classic texts of rights 
theory. More recently, the philosopher Wesley Hohfeld tried to cut across this bifurcation 
between the terms ‘right’ and ‘duty’ by instead identifying legal relations as one of either four 
‘jural correlatives’ (rights or ‘claim rights’ and duties; privileges, including legal liberty, and no-
rights; powers and liabilities; and immunities and disabilities) or four ‘jural opposites’ (not 
relevant for the present purposes) (Hohfeld 1923). In short, theorists of rights considered that 
the less dependent on duty a right was, the greater was its validity as a substantive normative 
value. 
 
Such discussion considered a related issue, namely whether rights were ‘subjective’ or 
‘objective’. If they were objective, they were beyond human control, a normative value that 
existed independently of humankind. In contrast, a subjective right was within human control, 
enforceable as an individual right. Villey (Villey 1975) recognised this intellectual shift, from 
objective to subjective, as a ‘watershed’ in the history of natural rights, and as having occurred 
by the seventeenth century. Many scholars see evidence for it in Hobbes’ Leviathan, a view 
commonly accepted today (Strauss 1953).  
 
But Villey himself and others located this shift in medieval thinkers. He was of the view that 
this occurred in the fourteenth-century medieval nominalism of William of Ockham’s 
Breviloquium. Prominent medievalist, Professor Brian Tierney (Tierney 1997) has suggested, 
however, that it was twelfth-century canon lawyers who transformed the term ius naturale 
(natural law, or right) from signifying an objective notion of law to a subjective one. Ius naturale 
or natural law was the medieval equivalent of human rights (Finnis 1980: 198). Tierney’s case 
for a twelfth-century origin to rights language is as follows. He begins with the question: 
‘When did the phrase ius naturale, which traditionally meant cosmic harmony or objective 
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justice or natural moral law, begin to acquire also the sense of a subjective natural right 
(Tierney 1997: 47)?’ 
 
Unpacking this inquiry, let us begin with the phrase ius naturale. Tierney’s concern was with the 
moment in history when ius (literally translatable as ‘law’ or ‘right’) changed from meaning 
‘objective law … [to] subjective right’ and naturale from meaning a ‘primeval state of affairs … 
[to] an intrinsic permanent characteristic of any being, as when we speak of “the nature of 
man”’ (Tierney 1997: 48). He argues the semantic shift from objective law to subjective right 
had not occurred before this. Greek (e.g. Sophocles), Stoic, and Roman thinkers conceived of 
natural rights as having this ‘intrinsic’ quality (as a natural law inherent in mankind), but not as 
subjective; in contrast their law was inexorable and divine: in the words of the classical Roman 
law jurist Julius Paulus the ius was ‘what is right and good’ (Tierney 1997: 46; but contrast 
Douzinas 2007 who posits a subjective notion of cosmopolitanism in the era of the Greek 
philosopher Zeno). 
 
But in the twelfth century, Tierney continues, the phrase ius naturale changed from a meaning 
of ‘cosmic harmony or objective justice or natural moral law … [to] acquire the sense of a 
subjective natural right’ (Tierney 1997: 46-47). In particular, this occurred in the writings of the 
medieval decretists Rufinus, Ricardus Anglicus, and Huguccio. Illustrative of this is Rufinus’s 
Summa composed around 1160 as a commentary on Gratian famous compilation of canon law 
texts. In commenting on Gratian’s definition of natural law (ius naturale ), he stated that it was 
‘a certain force instilled in every human creature by nature to do good and avoid the opposite. 
Natural ius consists in three things, commands, prohibitions and demonstrations’.3 The third of 
these is most significant as he used demonstrationes to mean ‘descriptions’ or ‘indications’ of 
behaviour that were ‘licit but not required. So in one of its meanings, ius naturale referred to an 
area of permitted behaviour where ‘nature does not command or forbid.’ This initial subjective 
definition of ius was important, as was the following tripartite division, especially the third of 
                                                 
3 Tierney 1997: 62-63 n. 68: ‘Est itaque naturale ius vis quedam humane creature a nature insita ad faciendum 
bonum cavendumque contrarium. Consistit autem ius naturale in tribus, scilicet: mandatis, prohibitionibus, 
demonstrationibus ….’. 
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permissible acts. In short, Rufinus exemplified some of the decretists recognition of licitness or 
a sphere of personal autonomy in the concept of ius naturale. 
 
As explanation for this emphasis on the individual as the subject and agent, that is on medieval 
notions of individual or natural rights – what we might recognise today as ‘human rights’ – 
Tierney points to the characteristics I have outlined earlier regarding the twelfth century 
‘renaissance’, namely that it was a period marked by concern for the individual, as well as with 
legal innovation and development. 
 
II. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH 
 
The approach that I am adopting in my project ‘Sacred Rules, Secular Revelations’ seeks a re-
assessment of Tierney’s theory concerning the twelfth-century origin of individual rights, as 
well as contributing more generally to debates on theories and origins of rights language. I 
outline this alternative methodology in what follows. In brief, my hermeneutic utilises 
traditional historical, theological, and legal historical approaches, but in a manner that 
transcends the traditional boundaries separating these disciplines. This transdisciplinarity, 
therefore, marks my approach as both grounded in, but running contrary to, previous scholarly 
studies in this area. Further, the simultaneous emphasis on praxis, or the application of rights 
in practice, has the potential to provide new insights and understandings for contemporary 
understandings of the origins of human rights. 
 
My previous work has examined the phenomenon of the later-twelfth-century Anglo-Norman 
‘lawyer-theologian’ (cf. the ‘Anglo-Norman’ canonists in Kuttner-Rathbone 1983), and this 
putative figure’s likely use of a ‘universal jurisprudence’ which combined law and theology. It is 
these figures and their treatises, letters, acta (administrative records of their actions as officials), 
and commentaries which suggest themselves as possible sources for articulations of the rights-
type of language discovered by Tierney in the twelfth-century canonists. I label them ‘lawyer-
theologians’ to emphasise their singular identity. They were, first and foremost, lawyers and 
bureaucrats. Most of them had received training in the schools of Paris or Bologna in the arts 
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and then had proceeded to higher studies in law or theology or both. Their works were 
generally what we today would call inter- or cross-disciplinary in that works of an ostensibly 
‘legal’ disposition included elements of theological influence, whether by way of scriptural 
quotes and biblical moralising or more sophisticated use of scholastic theological reasoning 
and argumentation. On the other hand, works of a seemingly theological or religious bent, 
such as discussion on aspects of the Eucharist for example, also included legal references 
through analogies to legal doctrine or concepts.  
 
There is no reportorium of these lawyer-theologians, as their identity is fluid and organic. Often 
identifying such figures requires reading their texts ‘against the grain’: in other words, reading 
theological texts with an eye to their legal import and perusing legal works with a view to their 
theological significance. I have provisionally identified five such figures as worthy of this kind 
of study; the list follows below.  
 
The first is Master Vacarius (c. 1115/20-c.1200). He trained in law at Bologna at the time of the 
Four Doctors and came to the household of the Archbishop of Canterbury in the 1140s and 
thence to York after 1159. His most famous work is the Liber pauperum, a selection of texts 
from the key Roman law sources designed for students and composed in Lincoln around the 
1170s or 1180s (although the date for this is much disputed: Landau 2009; cf. Boyle 1983). He 
also wrote other works on marriage, Christology, and heresy at around this same time 
(Taliadoros 2006b). The second lawyer-theologian is Gilbert Foliot (c.1105/10-1187/8). His 
letters and charters were composed in the period c.1139-77, when he was, respectively, abbot 
of the Benedictine house at Gloucester from 1139, bishop of Hereford from 1148, and bishop 
of London from 1163 until his death in 1187/8. He was likely educated in the arts, theology, 
and law, probably in Paris in the 1120s and 1130s (see Taliadoros 2006a). The third person of 
interest is Bartholomew of Exeter (d.1184), who was also likely educated in the arts, theology, 
and law at Paris, although a decade later than Gilbert, in the 1140s. He was part of the 
ecclesiastical household of Canterbury from 1138 (under Theobald, at the same time as 
Vacarius) and from 1161 he was first archdeacon and then bishop of Exeter. He penned his 
Penitential, a listing of sins and penances for confessors and curates alike in the early 1160s. 
This was extremely popular in its day judging by the number of extant manuscripts, and 
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unusual for its use of law (Taliadoros forthc. a). The significance of penitential literature in 
providing the foundation for subjectivity has been emphasised recently in a critique of 
international law and development (Beard 2007: 16-52). 
 
Peter of Blois (the Younger) (1125/30-1212) is best known for his famous letter collection, 
which he redacted or edited and collected twice, first in 1202 and then shortly before his death 
in 1212. He too studied arts at Tours in the 1140s, then law at Bologna mid 1140s, and 
theology at Paris from about 1155 onwards. After several positions at court on the Continent 
he came to Canterbury in 1174 as letter writer and later chancellor where he remained for the 
rest of his career (see Taliadoros forthc. b). The final figure is Ricardus Anglicus (b. early 1160s 
– 1242) whom we first hear of as a canonist and master at Paris in the 1180s, then as a master 
in law at Bologna in the 1190s, before returning to England where he was prior of the 
Augustinian canons at Dunstable between 1198 and 1202, where he served until his death. 
During this time, he served as an administrator, advocate, historian, and, after 1215, theologian. 
His works include several commentaries on Gratian composed in the 1180s and 1190s and the 
‘new’ decretal law in the late 1190s. One of these works is the Distinctiones decretorum, a very late 
(1196-98), and almost redundant, commentary on Gratian which is characterised by its 
elliptical, clipped, aphoristic distinctions. 
 
As can be seen, the provenance of these figures is predominantly Anglo-Norman, although 
their training in the schools of Italy and France mean that they retained links and connections 
beyond these nominal borders. Further, as opposed to Tierney’s more abstract and theoretical 
study of canonical commentators and academics, my proposed analysis of the texts of these 
medieval-theologians reflects how Gratian and the decretist commentators themselves were 
applied and used in practice. This is particularly so in the English context, whose first treatises 
of the nascent Common Law, namely Glanvill’s work in 1187-89 and Bracton’s treatise of the 
late 1230s, are produced at a time coinciding with broader legal and theological developments 
as well as the phenomenon of these lawyer-theologians. The approach that I bring to this 
project will supplement Tierney’s linguistic or semantic analysis of twelfth-century canonists in 
several important respects. It will include in its sample the texts of theologians and Roman 
lawyers, not just canonists as per Tierney. Further, my analysis will focus on twelfth- and 
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thirteenth-century Anglo-Norman England, the locality which produced the canonist Ricardus 
Anglicus, whom Tierney relies on as one of his examples of a subjective understanding of law 
(ius). Although Continental influence was strong in disseminating law and theology to England, 
the reforms of Henry II at the same time set the foundations for the beginnings of the court 
and jury systems which were to form the English Common Law (Brand 1992). Both these 
theoretical and practical approaches to law coalesced in the texts of the English lawyer-
theologians. Tierney did not sufficiently examine these unique circumstances in England that 
contributed to both theoretical and practical influences on law formation. Tierney’s neglect of 
these matters is understandable, given his stated focus on the specific term ius—a word more 
likely to have currency in the works of canonists than theologians. I discuss below further 
medieval cognates to the modern notions of ‘rights’ and ‘law’. 
 
My approach goes beyond acknowledging that medieval theologians and lawyers shared some 
areas of common interest (such as sacramental and ecclesiological matters: de Ghellinck 1948; 
Häring 1976). Such an analysis that simply combines law and theology is not new: Villey does 
this in exploring the origin of subjective rights, arguing that Ockham’s metaphysics created the 
necessary intellectual environment for a jurisprudence of individual rights. In addition, the 
similarities between lawyers and theologians in the scholastic method of dialectic and 
deduction developed in the schools, is well-established (e.g. Holopainen 1996; Gouron 2000).  
 
I suggest a more complex understanding of links between theologians and lawyers. Of 
particular significance is the way I will consider the interaction of law and theology in practice. 
It seeks to answer the question: how did lawyer-theologians apply notions of the ius commune 
(i.e. the term used to describe both canon and Roman law as part of the legal landscape of 
medieval Western Europe: Calasso 1954; Pennington 1994; Bellomo 1995) and of theology to 
everyday practical examples in their texts? In answering this, I adapt an approach taken by 
John Baldwin in his Masters, Princes, and Merchants, 1970. Baldwin’s study of twelfth- and early 
thirteenth-century scholastic theologians and lawyers in the Parisian scholastic milieu 
challenges the type-casting of scholasticism as a learned and academic, yet wholly abstract, 
method. In particular, it brings into question the notion of Roman law as merely academic, that 
is an abstract ‘learned law’ (Van Engen 1997). Instead, Baldwin’s study reveals that these 
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schoolmen applied legal and theological principles to resolving everyday problems and 
conflicts in Parisian political and social life, notably to conflicts in the schools, the courts, and 
in business (cf. also Biller 2000). In a similar way, I will be investigating Anglo-Norman lawyers 
and theologians applying proto-concepts of individual rights in everyday contexts. 
 
In extending the contexts and applications in which law and theology can be examined in 
medieval intellectual life, this project, additionally, incorporates and modifies approaches taken 
by the late Leonard Boyle (1986) and Augustine Thompson (1992 and 2006) to medieval 
‘pastoral’ writings. These scholars suggested that mid-twelfth and early thirteenth-century 
penitentials and confession instruction manuals utilised literary and didactic techniques in a 
quite different way from previously, in their conscious aim to facilitate and enhance 
communication with the parishioner. They termed this genre of writing ‘practical’ theology. In 
a similar manner, I explore the concept of practical theology in the writings of lawyers, one 
such example being usury. In that case, scholastic arguments drawn from biblical and patristic 
authorities determined a normative stance prohibiting usury (Noonan 1957). 
 
On the basis of what I have outlined above, therefore, I envisage the following structure being 
employed to understand these disparate legal and theological sources. First, it is necessary to 
preface the study with an introduction that outlines the difficulties that any historical 
examination of a modern concept of human rights, specifically accusations of anachronism, 
entails. Rather, my research aims to examine ‘proto-concepts of individual rights’. At first 
instance, it is necessary to distinguish different medieval conceptions of law linguistically. To 
name just a few examples of the potential for misunderstandings: ius (‘law’ in English; Recht in 
German, droit in French, diritto in Italian) means a legal system understood as a whole, and the 
general principles underlying such a legal system, or the expression of those general principles; 
lex (‘ordinance’ in English; Gesetz in German, loi in French, and legge in Italian) is the most 
general word for a written enactment; and constitutio (‘enactment’), meaning any kind of 
legislation, whether ecclesiastical or secular. The important thing to emphasise here is this 
study’s careful balancing of the search for ‘origins’ in rights language (and the concomitant 
teleology that this implies) and the need to strictly understand such terms and their constituent 
texts in their historical and cultural contexts.  
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I will then study medieval concepts linked to modern ‘equivalents’ of rights language concepts 
through two different but simultaneous kinds of inquiry. The first type of inquiry, what can be 
termed a ‘down-up’ model, provides specific instances where interactions of law and theology 
are examined and inductively give rise to broader themes of individual rights. Examples occur 
in the studies I (and others) have cited above in the twelfth-century context involving Anglo-
Norman figures, such as Master Vacarius, Gilbert Foliot, Peter of Blois (‘the Younger’), 
Bartholomew of Exeter, and Ricardus Anglicus. The second kind of inquiry is the ‘up-down’ 
model, which looks at certain themes which are a) relevant to medieval notions of individual 
rights and b) indicate a real interaction and consideration of law (both canon and Justinianic 
Roman law) and theology. These provisionally include the following: “each according to his 
own” (ius suum cuique tribuere), a concept which resonates with modern legal themes of equity, 
distributive and social justice (Kuttner 1980); individual and constitutional rights (Nederman 
1990, 1996, 1998); due process and notion of fair hearing relevant to modern judicial notions 
of procedural fairness; freedom to marry (Reid 1992, 2004); the secular and sacramental 
powers of the ordained clergy as exemplars for broader entitlements; the legal-theological 
licences and constraints relating to orthodoxy and heresy; and usury and ethics (Noonan 1957).  
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
To speak of ‘human rights’ in a medieval context may be anachronistic and misleading, but 
highlights the findings of important scholarship that has sought to draw lines of continuity 
between medieval understandings of ius and modern notions of ‘individual rights’.  
 
Tierney’s thesis has established the starting point for all medievalists on this terrain. This is 
despite trenchant criticism from political scientists, such as Cary Nederman, who have pointed 
out the narrow semantic range of Tierney’s exploration of ius naturale. Instead of taking a literal 
translation of the term, Nederman argues, one should look for interpretations of the term as 
referential to the political sphere, in particular the freedom from of the individual from 
despotic rule (Nederman 1990, 1996, 1998). While this critique shows a certain bias towards 
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law as politics, it does interrogate medieval notions of ius on a broader plain. It therefore 
complements, rather than disposes of, Tierney’s thesis. Likewise, my approach seeks to pursue 
already-established lines of investigation. 
 
An alternative approach I suggest uses Tierney’s study as a launching pad for a wider analysis 
of evidence and context. The texts of the lawyer-theologians, did not discuss law or rights in 
the abstract, but in practical contexts. In examining the works of such figures as Master 
Vacarius, Peter of Blois, Gilbert Foliot, Bartholomew of Exeter, and Ricardus Anglicus, and 
the uses to which these writers applied their knowledge of law and rights, I hope to provide a 
more nuanced picture of medieval conceptions of individual rights and thereby highlight some 
of the limitations in the prevailing scholarly approaches to understanding this area. 
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